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1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have come a long way. After
Kydland and Prescott (1982) demonstrated that a small DSGE model could match a
few simple features of the macro dataset, there ensued a 20 year research program of
adding both complexity to the model and data features to account for, and the models
gradually began to approximate the richness of the macroeconomy.
A watershed event came in 2003 when Smets and Wouters (2003) demonstrated
that the family of DSGE models had reached the point that it ‘fit’ seven key variables
about as well as some conventional benchmarks. They explain their main contribution:
[Our results] suggests that the current generation of DSGE models with
sticky prices and wages is sufficiently rich to capture the time-series prop-
erties of the data, as long as a sufficient number of structural shocks is
considered. These models can therefore provide a useful tool for monetary
policy analysis in an empirically plausible setup. (2003, p.1125)
Since Smets and Wouter’s demonstration, central banks around the world have
rapidly been building DSGE models and pressing them into the service of monetary
policymaking.
Not everyone agrees, however, that fitting a few variables as well as standard bench-
marks is a sufficient condition for the models to be ready for practical policy work at
central banks. For example, Sims (1980) famous critique of the models of the 1970s was
more or less that the 70s models were highly problematic despite their impressive fit.
Further, while the current DSGE models are large-scale models by standards of what is
possible to solve and manipulate, they are unquestionably small relative to what would
be ideal—standard models do not break out consumer durables, inventories, or housing,
and have trivial financial sectors.
Perhaps surprisingly, the debate over the adequacy of DSGE models recently rose to
the level of a Congressional hearing. Solow (2010) argued that the models were deeply
deficient:
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The national—not to mention the world—economy is unbelievably compli-
cated, and its nature is usually changing underneath us. So there is no
chance that anyone will ever get it quite right, once and for all. Economic
theory is always and inevitably too simple; that can not be helped. But
it is all the more important to keep pointing out foolishness wherever it
appears. Especially when it comes to matters as important as macroeco-
nomics, a mainstream economist like me insists that every proposition must
pass the smell test: does this really make sense? I do not think that the
currently popular DSGE models pass the smell test. (p.1)
Chari (2010), (p.7), agreed that “We do not fully understand the sources of the
various shocks that buffet the economy over the business cycle,” but testified that
“[Policy advice from DSGE models] is one ingredient, and a very useful ingredient, in
policy making.”
Of course, these views reflect a longstanding schism in macro. We seek to avoid this
argument over whether the glass is essentially empty or nearly full. To push this tired
metaphor to the breaking point, we argue that rather than focusing on how full the
glass is, we should focus on just what liquid we are being asked to swallow.
That is, we should focus on what are the particular strengths and weaknesses of the
models as they pertain to the intended task—monetary policymaking. Like Tiao and
Xu (1993), (p.640), we argue for “. . . development of diagnostic tools with a greater
emphasis on assessing the usefulness of an assumed model for specific purposes at hand
rather than on whether the model is true.”1
We believe that this perspective is particularly important when discussing models
for active use in the monetary policymaking process. Policy must be made. In lieu
of a formal, coherent model of important general equilibrium effects, the policymaking
process employs an implicit model consisting of sector experts and general equilibrium
experts hashing out the issues in (long and painful) meetings. The important issue is
1see also, e.g., Hansen (2005).
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not some overall quality judgement about the models, but assessing in what ways the
models could render the current policymaking process more reliable.
No one, we believe, is asserting DSGE models have reached the point that policy
can be placed more or less on model-based autopilot. Thus, we need tools for assessing
how DSGE models can best be used to inform expert judgement in the policymaking
process.
This chapter supports three claims:
First, while DSGE modelling has come a long way, there remains room for improve-
ment in areas that are materially important for policymaking. We think this claim
should be entirely uncontroversial but documenting some particulars provides a basis
for the later illustration of our proposed inference tools.
Second, prior and particularly posterior predictive analysis can be valuable tools in
assessing strengths and weaknesses of the DSGE models. Prior and posterior predictive
analysis were popularized by Box (1980) and have been extended in many ways. Our
contribution is to adapt these tools to the DSGE context and illustrate their usefulness.
Most notably, perhaps, we adapt the discrepancy analysis of Gelman et al. (1996), which
seems to have gotten little use in macro, to analyze the causal channels in DSGE models.
While prior and posterior predictive analysis has been widely used in many areas,
these techniques have also been criticized as being inconsistent with coherent inference.
Our third goal is to argue that standard criticisms of prior and posterior predictive anal-
ysis, whatever their merits in other contexts, miss the point in the DSGE context. In
particular, posterior predictive analysis can be viewed as a natural pragmatic Bayesian
response to a murky modelling problem.
These three points come in the next three sections. Along the way we discuss and
illustrate various aspects of implementing prior and posterior predictive analysis using
a version of the iconic Smets Wouters DSGE model. Smets and Wouters have been
incredibly gracious in helping us complete this work.
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2 Standard Approaches to Bayesian DSGE Mod-
elling for Monetary Policymaking
2.1 The Macro Modelling Problem
We will take largely as given a basic knowledge of the monetary policymaking process
and of DSGE modelling for use in the policymaking process. We provide the following
sketch. The policymakers of the central bank meet periodically to assess changes to
the values of the policy instruments under their control—the policy interest rates and
other policy tools. Taking as given the view adopted at the last meeting, a major task
at this meeting is to process the information that has arrived since the last meeting.
This processing is complicated by a number of features of the problem. The po-
tentially relevant information set is high dimensional. While there is no consensus on
how high-dimensional, the ongoing policymaking process closely monitors hundreds of
variables.2 Certain research supports the view that forecasts of relevant variables based
on datasets of, say, 70 or more variables outperform others3 and that the subjective
process that focuses even on broader information in some cases does even better (Faust
and Wright (2009)). Further, there is a rich set of dynamic feedbacks among the myr-
iad potentially relevant variables. By general consensus, general equilibrium effects
involving the expectations of a large set of heterogeneous agents may be central to the
policymaking problem.4
The existing policy process relies on many more and less formal tools, but is ulti-
mately heavily judgmental. The goal in DSGE modelling is to build a new model to aid
in the process of interpreting incoming data, forecasting, and simulation of alternative
policies.
2For example, see the Federal Reserve’s policy meeting briefing materials that are now available at
http : //www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical.htm
3e.g., Bernanke et al. (2005a); Bernanke and Boivin (2003); Faust and Wright (2009); Forni et al.
(2005); Giannone et al. (2004); Stock and Watson (1999, 2002, 2003, 2005).
4For example, policy is often described as expectations management. See, e.g., Bernanke et al.
(2005b).
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From a modelling standpoint, forecasting does not strictly require a structural model
(that is, a model with explicit causal channels). The simulation of likely outcomes under
alternative counterfactual policy assumptions does require a structural model, as does
the attribution of unexpected movements in incoming data to particular causes. A
textbook example of the latter is attempting to sort out whether a recent unexpected
rise in GDP growth is primarily due to supply or demand shocks. As these two causes
may have different implications for policy, much policy analysis involves this sort of
inference.
This modelling problem is made more challenging by the fact that the relevant
body of theory provides only limited guidance on short-run and medium-run dynamics.
While theory gives us broad guidance on overall dynamics, small adjustment costs, rule
of thumb behavior, and similar effects can dominate shorter run dynamics.
Ideally, we need a model with fully articulated causal structure of a very large and
complicated system where theory provides limited guidance on important aspects of
the dynamics. The final complication is that we have a single historical sample for the
process we are modelling, the world macroeconomy. The models will be specified and
refined on this familiar dataset. New information arrives only with the passage of time.
By general consensus, the historical sample is not large enough to definitively resolve
all important issues. The ongoing lack of consensus on basic questions in macro is clear
testament to the idea that our only available sample is not resoundingly informative on
all relevant policymaking issues.
2.2 Description of DSGE Modelling and the SW Model
The approach in DSGE modelling is to explicitly state the decision problems of groups
of agents—e.g., households and firms—including objective functions and constraints.
Together with the adding up constraints on the economy as a whole, gives a complete
system. For example, households choose consumption (hence, saving) and labor supply
to maximize a utility function. Firms choose investment and labor input to maximize a
profit function. Ultimately the solutions these individual optimization problems, when
6
combined with overall resource and adding up constraints, imply the dynamic behavior
of the variables modelled. As noted below, given the complexity of the models, we gen-
erally end up working with some approximation to the full model-implied dynamics—
most often a log-linear approximation to the deviations from some steady-state implied
by the model.
A key feature of this kind of modelling is that agents are forward looking. In the
simplest forms of the decision problems, forward looking agents immediately react to
news about future conditions, and adjust their behavior much more quickly than is
consistent with the macroeconomic data. Thus, ‘frictions’ are added to the decision
problems in order to slow down what would otherwise be excessively jumpy behavior
by agents.
Our example model is a version of the SW model. In particular, we use the model
described in Smets and Wouters (2007).5 The model is an extension of a standard closed
economy DSGE model with sticky wages and sticky prices, largely based on Christiano
et al. (2005). The model explains seven observables, with quantity variables in real,
per capita terms: GDP growth, consumption growth, and investment growth, hours
worked, inflation, real wage growth, and a short-term nominal interest rate.
The model introduces a rich set of frictions in the decision problems of agents—the
Calvo friction for prices and wages, habit formation in consumption, and investment
adjustment costs. The seven structural shocks are assumed to follow exogenous, inde-
pendent persistent (autoregressive of order 1) processes and are interpreted as shocks
to overall productivity, investment productivity, a risk premium, government spending,
wage mark-up, price mark-up, and the monetary policy interest rate rule.
Because we will focus on consumption as an example later, it is worth going into a
bit more detail on the consumption problem. Consumers are assumed to maximize the
5The log-linearized equations of the model are provided in appendix A. Readers are referred to
Smets and Wouters (2007) for a thorough explanation of the model equations and frictions.
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where Ct is consumption at time t, Lt is labor hours at t and H, σc and σl are scalar
parameters. The consumption portion of the utility function has habit persistence
parameterized by h and risk aversion parameterized by σc, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (CRRA). Larger values of h tend to imply that agents will be more reluctant
to change consumption.
2.3 Estimation
Explicitly Bayesian inference methods are the norm in this area. The methods used
are, at a general level, a straightforward application of what we will call the plain
vanilla Bayesian approach.6 In a nutshell, this approach requires data, a parameterized
model, and a joint prior distribution for the parameters of the model. The model
implies a likelihood function for the data, and the model and prior together exhaustively
characterize the state of knowledge of the researcher before the new data arrive. The
plain vanilla Bayesian scheme tells us how to update the view reflected in the prior
density in light of new information that arrives.
Specifically, call the data Y and the model Mθ, with parameter vector θ ∈ Θ. In
the DSGE case, the likelihood, L(θ|Y ), is implied by the specification of the economic
model. Once one has specified the model and processes for the exogenous driving pro-
cesses, the decision problems of the agents can be solved and this solution implies a
likelihood function. Generally for computational reasons we use a log-linear approxi-
mation to the exact solution of the model where the approximation is centered on a
non-stochastic steady-state of the model. This approximation gives rise to a linear,
ARMA structure for the dynamics of the model.
6Plain vanilla here describes the application of Bayesian principles to a plain vanilla context. This
does not tell us what Bayesian principles imply in a richer context such as—we argue—the one described
here.
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The data tend to be taken from the standard macro data set; the sample period
tends to be the longest continuous sample for which data are available and for which
the structure of the economy was reasonably stable. This latter is a bit of a judgement
call. SW estimate the model using US data from 1966Q1 to 2004Q4.
Often there are multiple choices to be made for choosing model-based analogs to
key quantities in the model. For example, analysts sometimes use only nondurables
plus services consumption as the measure of consumption, since the model does not
have durables. SW’s consumption measure includes durables.
The prior, p0 is a joint density for θ over the parameter space Θ. The conventional
prior used in DSGE modelling varies, but in general terms the formal prior is often
specified as a set of marginal distributions for each individual parameter. These are
taken to be independent, implying the joint distribution for the prior. Generally, some
natural support for each parameter is implied by economic principles, technical stability
conditions for the model, and/or earlier applied work. The prior is specified to be fairly
dispersed over this support. Through trial and error, the analyst may find regions of
the parameter space in which the model seems ill-behaved in some way, and the support
is narrowed.
While the papers often have arguments justifying the support of the prior and,
perhaps, where it is centered, we have seen no argument that the joint prior implied by
the independent specification of marginal priors for the parameters has any justification
or has any tendency to produce results that are consistent with any subjective prior
beliefs.7
Given the state of knowledge reflected in the model+prior and the new information
in the sample, a straightforward application of Bayes’ law gives us,
p1(θ) ≡ pr(θ|Y r) = κp0(θ)L(Y r|θ)
where κ is the constant that makes the integral of the expression on the right (with
7In some cases some span of data at the beginning of the available sample is used as a ‘training
sample’ so that the prior is tuned to reflect that dataset. We take this up below.
9
respect to θ) integrate to one.
The prior and posterior densities for the two key consumption parameters are shown
in Figure 1. Both posteriors are centered at about the same place as the prior, but
the posteriors are considerably more peaked, indicating that that data are somewhat
informative. The habit persistence parameter is fairly large, suggesting that agents are
highly averse to changing consumption; the CRRA parameter is in the range that has
become conventional for estimates of models like this on this sample.
2.4 Material Deficiencies, Omissions and Coarse Approxima-
tions
Given the size of the system being modelled and the current stage of understanding of
the relevant mechanisms and modelling techniques and related algorithms, it remains
the case that existing DSGE models involve coarse approximation to some economic
mechanisms believed relevant for policymaking and omit other such mechanisms en-
tirely. This is meant to be a description of the current state of development, not a
criticism. To motivate the remainder of this chapter, it is useful to provide some detail
on the state of modelling.
Consider omitted mechanisms and phenomena. Most standard DSGE models do
not separately treat durable goods, inventories, or housing, despite conventional wis-
dom that these items play an important role in business cycles. Many experts believe
that credit spreads have important predictive content that might be important for pol-
icymaking (e.g., Gilchrist et al. (2009)), but defaultable debt is not modelled. Indeed,
until the crisis, the financial sector of these models was entirely trivial. This list of
omissions could obviously go much longer.
It is also true that the modelling of phenomena included in the model is often best
viewed as a coarse approximation relative to the best knowledge of specialists in the
particular area.
For example, important aspects of individual behavior toward risk is parameter-
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ized by the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In the best tradition of microfounded
modelling, we might ask experts in individual behavior toward risk what values for this
parameter might be appropriate. Unfortunately, expert opinion is overwhelmingly clear
on one point: individual behavior toward risk is a rich phenomenon not well captured
by this single parameter.8 Many micro phenomena simply cannot be accounted for un-
der this assumption. Suppose we tell the expert we are viewing this as a representative
agent approximation to underlying behavior, but would still like guidance on the value.
The expert should then remind us that different values will be best depending on the
goals of the approximation: to ‘fit’ the equity premium from 1889 to 1978, CRRA >
10 (Mehra and Prescott (1985)); to ‘fit’ aggregate lottery revenue probably requires
risk loving; to fit the reaction of consumption to changes in monetary policy, probably
some value not too far from one is appropriate. As a description of individual behavior,
CRRA specification is a crude approximation. The choice of parameter value should
be based mainly on how best to center the approximation for a particular purpose.
Analogous issues can be raised about the treatment of habits. At the individual
level there is little evidence for strong habits (Dynan (2000)), but strong habits in
the model seem to be needed to ‘fit’ the smooth evolution of aggregate consumption
data. Alternative explanations for the aggregate persistence include serially correlated
measurement error (Wilcox (1992)) aggregation biases (Attanasio and Weber (1993)),
and ‘sticky expectations’ (Carroll et al. (forthcoming)).
We could do a similar analysis in these models of the labor market, investment, and
the financial sector. Our goal is to provide some concrete meaning to the statement
that many arguably relevant mechanisms are omitted, many included mechanisms are
coarse approximations.
Finally, it also the case that the prior used in these analysis is far from the idealized
case in which the model+prior fully reflects the subjective views of the relevant analysts.
As Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) note, there is no reason to suppose that taking
reasonable marginal priors for the parameters and treating these as independent will
8For a good review, see Camerer (1995).
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lead to reasonable general equilibrium implications for the model as a whole. As we
shall see below, it is not difficult to find examples where the prior is highly informative
and at odds with conventional wisdom.
Rather than focusing on particulars, however, our point about that material defi-
ciencies remain is probably best illustrated by the revealed preferences of modelers at
central banks. The models remain in a state of substantial ongoing refinement and
revision.
3 Prior and Posterior Predictive Analysis
The plain vanilla scheme described above tells us how optimally to shift our views on
the relative plausibility of different parameter values θ ∈ Θ. But it can never cast
doubt on whether the model as whole, Mθ, θ ∈ Θ, is adequate. In any context, this is
potentially troubling—George Box famously reminds us, all models are wrong–but it
is particularly troubling in a context where we are using an ad hoc prior over a model
with materially important aspects of approximation error and omission.
Box popularized a family of tools for checking whether an admittedly wrong model
might be useful based on prior and posterior predictive analysis. Box’s ideas have been
elaborated in a number of ways in the statistics and economics literature.9
In this section, we take as given the conventional pragmatic arguments in favor
of prior and posterior predictive analysis and illustrate the way it could be used to
highlight strengths and weaknesses of DSGE models.10 The basic analytics of prior
and posterior predictive analysis are all well-established in the statistics literature. Our
contribution is to adapt these tools in ways particularly useful in DSGE work.
9For example, Geweke (2005, 2007, 2010); Bernardo (1999); Gelman et al. (1996); Lancaster (2004).
10It might seem more natural to give the theoretical justification before the applications. Our
theoretical arguments, however, turn on unique practical aspects of the DSGE context that are best
discussed after seeing some concrete examples.
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3.1 Prior and Posterior Predictive Analysis Defined
Predictive analysis relies on simple idea: if the available sample is too freakish from the
standpoint of the model+prior or model+posterior, then perhaps the model or prior
should be refined.11
The essence of the argument can be seen in a simple example. You are attempting
to do inference on the probability of observing a draw greater than 3 from some random
variable. The model states that the sample is independent and identically distributed
(iid) draws from a Gaussian with unknown mean and variance one. The prior for the
mean is uniform on [0, 1]. You obtain a sample of 50 observations and notice that the
histogram of these observations is highly skewed to the right (Figure 2, panel (a)). This
sample would be very unlikely to arise if the outcomes were indeed iid Gaussian.
The generic idea of predictive analysis is that one might want to reconsider the
model+prior at this point, but two additional ideas are worth emphasizing. The right
skewness may be materially important to the task at hand, since right skewness could
have a large effect on the probability of observing greater than 3. Thus, one can focus on
relevant features. Second, one sensible option would be to obtain another sample. But
we are focusing on the case in large-scale, general equilibrium macroeconomics—new
information will only arrive slowly.
Predictive analysis provides formal tools for judging the degree to which relevant
features of a sample are freakish from the standpoint of the model+prior. By feature,
we mean any well-behaved function of the data: h(Y ).12 Following the spirit in much
macroeconomics one might think of these as empirical measures corresponding to some
‘stylized fact.’ In the example just given, it would be natural to use the sample skewness
as the data feature.13 The sample skewness for the example sample is 1.05, whereas the
11It might seem most natural to change the model, but in cases like DSGE modelling where the
prior is substantially arbitrary, it is not unnatural to think of deciding that the arbitrary choice of
prior had put mass in ‘the wrong place.’










population skewness of any Gaussian is zero. However, one might wonder how likely
one would be to observe a sample skewness of 1.05 in a sample of size 50 from the
model+prior at hand.
The model+prior imply a marginal distribution for any h(Y rep), where Y rep is a
sample of the size at hand drawn according to the model+prior:
Fh(c) ≡ pr(h(Y rep) ≤ c) (3.1)
Define Y r to be the realized sample. One can plot the implied density, fh(x), along
with the realized value h(Y r) on the sample get a sense of whether the realized value
is freakish. Our example model+prior can indeed produce samples with large positive
and negative values for the sample skewness, but would do so very rarely—the sample
value of 1.05 is far in the tail of the predictive distribution.
Where large values are considered unlikely, Box suggested a prior predictive p-value
defined as,
1− Fh(h(Y r)).
This is the probability of observing h(Y ) greater than the realized value in repeated
sampling if the data were generated by the model+prior. For our example, the p-value
is 0.002, or 0.2 percent.
There are, of course, dangers in summarizing a distribution with a single number
such as a p-value. Such crude summaries should be used with caution, and we will
largely report the entire predictive density. Still at times, p-values provide a convenient
and compact summary.
We can use the posterior for the parameters of the model, p1, instead of p0 in (3.1)
in computing the predictive density, to obtain the posterior predictive distribution and
posterior predictive p-value. Once again, these predictive densities depict the likelihood
of observing specified sample features in repeated sampling from the model+prior or
model+posterior.
where yt is the t
th observation and y¯ is the sample mean.
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The data features we have discussed so far are a function of Y alone. In modeling
causal channels we are not only interested in description, but in why events happen the
way they do. To shed light on causal channels, it is also useful to consider features that
are a function of the sample and θ: h(Y, θ). We’ll call the former ‘descriptive’ features
and the latter ‘structural’ features, to emphasize the dependence of the latter on the
structural parameter.
Gelman et al. (1996) have written extensively on what we call structural features.14
These seem to have received little application in macroeconometrics.
Since structural features depend on the unobserved value of θ, they are a bit more
subtle to understand than descriptive features. A symptom of the difficulty is that
even after observing the sample, there is no single realized value on the sample at hand.
However, conditional on any fixed θ∗, we can compute h(Y r, θ∗) and, thus,
pr(h(Y rep, θ∗) > h(Y r, θ∗))
where Y rep is a random sample of the same size as Y r drawn according to θ∗. Con-
ditional on θ∗, this corresponds to the p − value computed above. As always we can
integrate out the dependence on the unobserved θ∗ using the prior or posterior to get,
pr(h(Y rep, θrep) > h(Y r, θrep)), where θrep is drawn according to the prior or posterior.
This is analogous to the p-value computed above.15
Gelman et al. suggest the following computational approach, which may aid in
understanding the above expression. Focus on the posterior version for concrete-
ness. The model+prior imply a joint distribution for θ and Y . Thus, we can assess
pr(h(Y rep, θrep) > h(Y r, θrep)) by repeating the following steps a large number of times,
where on the jth step we,
14Gelman et al. call h(Y, θ) a discrepancy variable or simply discrepancy. The idea is that the feature
is meant to help detect a discrepancy between the model and sample.
15An alternative for dealing with the unobserved θ is to create some summary scalar. We could
examine the value at the posterior mode, or the mean value for the feature where the mean is taken
with respect to the prior or posterior. We discuss how our approach complements these others in the
applications below.
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1. Draw θ(j) according to the posterior
2. Compute h(Y r, θ(j))
3. Draw Y (j) according to θ(j)
4. Compute h(Y (j), θ(j))
5. Save the pair h(Y r, θ(j),h(Y (j), θ(j))
The marginal distribution of the h(Y r, θ(j))s is a density corresponding to the real-
ized value in descriptive features. The marginal distribution of the h(Y r, θ(j))s is the
posterior predictive distribution for this feature.
The scatter plot of h(Y (j), θ(j)) (on the vertical axis) against h(Y r, θ(j)) (horizontal)
will give a sense of the joint distribution of the two items, and the share of points falling
above the 45 degree line is an estimate of the p-value described above. This p-value
is the probability in repeated sampling from the model+posterior, that we observe a
sample generated under a θ0 for which the h exceeds the h implied by θ0 on the realized
sample.
Obviously, if it is small values that one wishes to detect then, the share of points
under the 45 degree line constitutes a p-value. More generally, inspection of the joint
distribution will, once again, be more informative than a simple p-value computation.
Note that the predictive p-value for descriptive statistics can be computed using a
simplified version of the same algorithm exploiting the fact that h does not depend on
θ. Thus, the second step above may be computed outside the loop and the realized
density collapses to a point and all we have to plot is the marginal predictive density
and the realized point value. These are the algorithms we use in the examples reported
below.
3.2 Illustrations I: Descriptive Features
In this section, we illustrate how these techniques can be used to discover and highlight
strengths and weaknesses of DSGE models using the SW model. This is not intended
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as a thorough substantive critique of this model; rather, we present examples meant
to illustrate the functionality of the methods. We attempt to provide a substantive
analysis in other papers (Gupta (2010), Faust and Gupta (2010b), Faust (2009)).
It is useful to keep in mind two forms of analysis that are complementary to what
we are advocating: moment matching and full blown likelihood analysis. In traditional
moment matching with a DSGE model, one selects (either by estimation or calibra-
tion) values for the parameter, θ, and then compares population moments implied by
the model to the corresponding sample moments for the sample at hand. In a full-
blown Bayesian-inspired likelihood analysis, the emphasis is on comparing models or
parameter values based on the relative likelihoods, perhaps, as weighted with the prior.
We seek to emphasize how posterior predictive analysis can be a complement to each.
In traditional moment matching as started in the DSGE literature by Kydland and
Prescott (1982), one might focus on the some version of the variance covariance matrix
of the variables—say standard deviations, correlations, and autocorrelations. In SW for
example, the correlation of inflation and output growth at the posterior mode is -0.22,
while the corresponding sample correlation is -0.31. It is difficult to assess whether this
is a success or failure of the model, in part, because this comparison fails to represent
two potential areas of uncertainty. First, summarizing the model only by the correlation
at a single θ does not reflect uncertainty in the choice of parameter. Replacing the single
value at the posterior mode with the posterior density for θ will bring the uncertainty
in θ into the comparison (Figure 3, blue dashed line). To emphasize, the blue line is the
posterior density for the population correlation implied by θ. Since the sample value
is relatively far into the tail of the posterior density, one might once again take this as
evidence against the model.
There is a second aspect of uncertainty, however: the sample correlation is not
a precise estimate of the population correlation in the underlying process driving the
economy. Regardless of the population correlation, the model+prior could, in principle,
imply that any sample correlation might be observed in a small sample.
The posterior predictive density tells us what sort of values we would expect to see
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for the sample correlation in repeated sampling with sample size equal to the sample
size at hand. It turns out (Figure 3, black line) that under the model+posterior,
there is nothing particularly freakish about seeing sample correlations of -0.31 when
the population value is -0.22 at the posterior mode.
In this case, it is important to keep the interpretation in mind: the model is con-
sistent with the data essentially because the model implies that the sample correlation
will be poorly measured—correlations like that observed in the data are likely to be
observed even when the true correlation is quite different.
Posterior predictive analysis provides a way to investigate and highlight known prob-
lem areas of the model. For example, the correlation of consumption and investment
growth in DSGE models has been a continuing problem. For most countries consump-
tion and investment growth are strongly positively correlated: booms and busts tend
to involve both consumption and investment. There are forces in the model, however,
that tend to drive this correlation toward zero.16 In the SW model, the posterior for
this correlation is centered on low values (Figure 4, panel(a), black solid line), and
the sample value over 0.5 is far in the tail of the posterior. In this case, the posterior
predictive density is slightly more dispersed (Figure 4, panel(b), black solid line), but
the p-value remains below 1 percent. Formally, if samples were repeatedly drawn from
the model+posterior, less than 1 percent of draws would give values as extreme as that
observed on the sample.
In cases where the model+posterior suggest that that the sample at hand is freak-
ish, there are three natural diagnoses: i) strange samples happen, ii) the model needs
refinement, and iii) the prior needs refinement. This last possibility, of course, arises
particularly when the prior has ad hoc elements. To shed some light on this latter
possibility we can look at the prior predictive density. If the prior predictive density
strongly favors low or negative correlations of investment and consumption growth,
then the posterior result could be due to the unfortunate choice of prior. In the cur-
16For example, a productivity shock that raises real interest rates may raise investment but reduce
consumption due to the increased incentive to save.
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rent example, however, this is not the case (Figure 4, panel(b), blue dashed line). The
marginal prior for this sample correlation actually favors large positive correlations.
For the SW model, the update using the data overpowered the strong prior and
pushed the posterior estimate to the far side of the sample value. This illustrates the
complexity of working with large dynamic systems. The θs that give large positive
correlations of consumption and investment must have been downweighted by the like-
lihood because those θs have some other implication that is at odds with the sample.
Smets and Wouters included what they call the risk premium shock in their model with
the express purpose of boosting the correlation of consumption and investment growth.
This shock seems to do the trick in the prior, but not the posterior. We return to this
structural issue below.
These examples were intended to illustrate how posterior predictive analysis could
complement or extend the sort of moment matching exercises that have been common
in the literature.
Of course, defenders of full-blown Bayesian analysis have long criticized moment
matching. Looking at a few marginal distributions for individual moments is no sub-
stitute for a metric on the whole system, and the likelihood itself is the natural way of
summarizing the full implications of the model. Full likelihood analysis may show, for
example, that posterior odds favor DSGE model A over DSGE model B. In the analysis
suggested by Del Negro et al. (2007), one forms a Bayesian comparison of the DSGE
model to a general time series model. In this case, one can learn that data shift pos-
terior plausibility mass along a continuum from the fully articulated structural model
to the general model with no causal interpretability. This sort of comparison may be
very useful as an overall metric on how the model is doing.
We are considering model building for ongoing, real-time policy analysis, however.
All the models have material deficiencies and are under ongoing substantial revision.
Thus, echoing our second and third main points from the introduction, we argue that in
addition to full-blown likelihood analysis it is important systematically to explore the
particular strengths and weaknesses of the model salient to the purpose of policymaking.
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The fact that the posterior shifts mass from one model toward another is not very
revealing of the particular strengths and weaknesses of either. We argue that by using
a richer set of data features than simple moments, some important aspects of the models
can be revealed.
For example, Gupta (2010) argues that an important part of policy analysis at
central banks is interpreting surprising movements in the data. Policy at one meeting
is set based on anticipated outcomes for the economy. At each successive meeting,
policymakers assess how new information has changed the outlook and what this implies
for the appropriate stance of policy. In a formal model, this amounts to interpreting
the one-step (where a step is one decision making period) ahead forecast errors from
the model.
The simplest substantive example of this perspective comes in the textbook aggre-
gate supply/aggregate demand model. If prices and output come in above expectation,
one deduces that an unexpected positive shock has shifted AD. If output is higher but
prices lower than expected, one deduces that a favorable supply shock has shifted aggre-
gate supply. In the textbook case, the two outcomes have different policy implications.
The key insight Gupta argues for is that policymakers need more than a model
that forecasts well in some general sense. They need a model that properly captures
the joint stochastic structure of the forecast errors. As a simple way to examine the
properties of the model in this regard, we can take our descriptive feature to be the
correlation of one-step forecast errors out of a benchmark time series model estimated
on the sample. For example, one could use a first order vector autoregression (VAR), a
Bayesian VAR, or a VAR with lag length set by the AIC between 0 and 6. All that is
required is that based on the sample alone, one can evaluate the value of the feature.
For our illustration example, we use the simplest of these, the first-order VAR.
Since output growth is a major focus of policy, we focus for this example on the
correlation of the output growth forecast error with the errors for the other 6 variables.
The prior and posterior predictive densities along with the sample value are examined
in Figure 5.
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Several notable results can be seen. First, the prior is highly opinionated putting
most mass on correlations near one. This illustrates again that although the marginal
prior distributions for the parameters are fairly dispersed, the joint implications of the
largely ad hoc prior for questions of interest in policymaking may be highly concentrated.
Indeed, it may be highly concentrated in regions that do not reflect any subjective prior
judgements. No expert believes that if we could just forecast output growth properly
we could also nail a forecast for hours of work, but this view is reflected in the mass
near one in Figure 5, panel(c) (blue dashed line).17
The realized value of the forecast error correlation is fairly generally far in the tail
of the posterior predictive distribution. In particular, the relation between output and
inflation (two key policy variables) is problematic. Of course, the literal meaning is that
the sample is freakish from the standpoint of the model+posterior. More provocatively,
in practice on the realized sample, policymakers were systematically faced with the
problem of interpreting inflation and output growth surprises of opposite signs (negative
realized correlation in Figure 5, panel(d)). The model+posterior says that this pattern
was a freak outcome and policymakers need not worry much about this problem in the
future.
This simple example is only illustrative. Policymakers will in practice use a more
sophisticated forecasting model. Thus, one might ideally choose a more sophisticated
benchmark forecasting model. Or one could analyze the properties of optimal model-
consistent forecast errors. Gupta (2010) provides a version of this more complete anal-
ysis.
3.3 Illustrations II: Structural Features
Ultimately, policymakers must go beyond the descriptive in order to draw inferences
about the causes of economic variation and the likely causes of policy responses. Iden-
17A complete diagnosis of this fact is beyond the scope here. However, it appears that this is due
to the fact that all the shocks enter the prior with the same parameters. Despite being ‘the same’ in
this nominal sense, a given variance shock means something different economically depending on how
it enters the model. In this case the result seems to be that the prior is that demand shocks dominate.
21
tifying causal structure in macro is very contentious, and when using a large model,
the problem is multiplied by the complexity of the system. It is very difficult to look at
a model and judge whether the causal structure as a whole is broadly consistent with
any given view. One natural way to focus the examination is to analyze what ‘causal
story’ the model tells of the fluctuations in the familiar sample. In doing so, we shift
the large and amorphous question, ‘how does the model say the world works?’ to ‘What
light does the model shed on the sample that is the source of our current expertise and
conventional wisdom?’
In the current literature it is common to present a historical decomposition of head-
line variables like GDP growth in terms of the underlying structural shocks. Technically,
for any value of θ, we can compute our best estimate of the underlying latent struc-
tural shocks. Given the linear Gaussian structure assumed for the model, these can be
computed with the Kalman smoother18. The standard practice seems to be to produce
a historical decomposition in terms of the smoothed shocks evaluated at the posterior
mode for the parameter. For example, (Figure 6) taken from Smets and Wouters (2007)
shows that the SW model attributes much of the deep recession in 1982 to the collective
effect of demand shocks in the model. Demand shocks also account for much of the
recession in 2001.
These decompositions can be a very useful tool for understanding the models, and
posterior predictive analysis of structural features can form a valuable complement to
these historical decompositions. First, note that making judgments about the model
based on decompositions like this has the same problems that arise in the simple moment
matching discussed above: it ignores uncertainty in θ and if something seems amiss, it
provides no systematic way to judge just how implausible or freakish the result is.
There are many ways to use posterior predictive analysis to provide more systematic
results complementary to the historical decompositions. For example, for a broad overall
check we can take our structural feature, our h(Y, θ), to be elements of the sample
correlation matrix of the smoothed estimates of the structural shocks. Remember that
18Harvey (1991)
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the structural shocks are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated in the model.
Each θ (when combined with a sample) implies a sample correlation matrix for
smoothed shocks, so this is a well-defined structural feature. Since θ is unknown, we will
not have a single realized value on the sample at hand; instead we will have a posterior
density for the realized value that takes into account our remaining uncertainty about
θ. Following Gelman’s suggestion, we can, however, consider the joint posterior density
for the feature on the realized sample and predictive samples.
For example, take as our structural feature the sample correlation of the risk pre-
mium shock and the price markup shock. We represent the posterior predictive infor-
mation (Figure 7, panel(f)) in a scatter plot in which each point represents a joint draw
of a θ and a replication sample. For each such draw we compute and plot the pair
(h(Y r, θ), h(Y rep, θ))—the feature on the realized and on the predictive sample, respec-
tively. We plot these pairs as a scatter plot with the realized value on the horizontal axis
and predictive sample on the vertical axis. If a typical draw from the model+posterior
implies a sample correlation like that implied for the realized sample, the points of the
scatter will lie around the 45 degree line.
For the chosen correlation, the entire point cloud is well below the 45 degree line.
This implies that there is no value for the structural parameter that is likely to produce
a correlation of these two structural shocks as high as that implied on the realized
sample.19 (Note: in scatter plots like Figure 7, the number in the upper left corner of
the panel is the share of points on whichever side of the 45 degree line has a smaller
share of points.)
The point cloud in this case is tall and thin. The fact that the point cloud is quite
narrow tells us that for the bulk of θs getting posterior mass, the sample correlation
on the realized sample is a bit over 0.2: for all relevant θs, the sample correlation of
these shocks was substantial and in the 0.2 range. The height of the cloud spans values
from about -0.15 to +0.15 and is roughly centered on zero. This gives a sense of what
we would expect to see for this sample correlation in repeated sampling. Values vary
19Actually, we should say there is no θ getting nontrivial posterior mass with the stated property.
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some, but are mainly clustered near the population value of zero. There is very little
chance that the model+posterior would generate a sample implying a sample correlation
between these shocks as high at 0.2.
There is no sign of discrepancy between the data and model+posterior for the sample
standard deviation of the risk premium shock (Figure 7, panel(a)) or its correlation with
the wage markup shock (Figure 7, panel(g)). The correlation with the productivity
(Figure 7, panel(b)) and government spending shocks (Figure 7, panel(c)), however, on
the sample are far from what the model+posterior would be likely to generate.
What is the interpretation? Of course, nature may have given us a sample that just
happened to imply large sample correlations among the smoothed shocks. If we set
this possibility aside, we must consider misspecification of the causal channels in the
model.20 The logic of the model is that these shocks originate in behaviorally distinct
sectors of the economy and the population correlation is zero in the model (for every θ).
In order to accommodate the sample using the causal channels specified in the model,
however, various of these causal forces had to systematically work in concert. If one
strongly believes that these forces are originating in behaviorally distinct sectors of the
economy (as is the standard assumption) then the model needs refining. Otherwise,
some causal account of the linkages must be specified.
As noted above, the risk premium shock was included in the model to help accom-
modate the positive correlation of consumption and investment growth in the sample.
Above, we saw that difficulties remain in this descriptive feature. This analysis provides
further evidence that perhaps that aspect of the model is misspecified. Gupta (2010)
argues that a more systematic look at the full set of correlations among the structural
shocks can provide valuable clues to economic sources of the misspecification and guide
future model refinement.
There are many ways to go beyond mere correlations of structural shocks to focus on
issues important in policymaking. For example, understanding and avoiding inefficient
20In principle, the result could be an artifact of the prior once again, but the fact that the population
correlation is zero for every θ and a check of the prior predictive distributions suggests this is unlikely.
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recessions is one goal of monetary policy. Thus, it is natural to focus on how the model
helps us understand the recessions in the sample.
In the U.S., it is well known that periods of at least two consecutive quarters of
negative GDP growth correspond fairly closely to the NBER’s definition of recessions.
Thus, on any sample, we can partition the observations of the smoothed structural
shocks into those occurring in an episode of at least two quarters of negative GDP
growth and the others. We can examine the posterior predictive description the model
provides of the recessions in the sample.
For example, take as our feature the sample standard deviation of the smoothed
risk premium shock during periods of recession and boom (Figure 8). The analysis
provides no indication of problem with the standard deviation on the full sample or
during booms (Figure 8, panel(a) and panel(c)). The sample standard deviation during
recessions on the realized sample, however, is much higher than we would expect to
observe under the model+posterior (Figure 8, panel(b)). Indeed, we can take as our
feature the difference in the sample standard deviation in recession and boom periods.
This difference (Figure 8, panel(d)) is once again considerably larger than we would
expect to see out of a sample drawn at random from the sample+posterior.
Recessions in the post-War sample, according to the model, were a collective freak
occurrence of abnormally large risk premium shocks occurring systematically at busi-
ness cycle frequencies. Faust and Gupta (2010b) provide a more complete analysis of
this topic finding similar results for other structural shocks. Once again, we can ac-
cept that nature gave us a very strange sample in which some of the focal events for
policymakers—recessions—repeatedly arose for reasons that are highly unlikely ever to
be repeated, or one can consider model+prior refinement.
The main point in this section is to illustrate potential uses for posterior predictive
analysis, and not to provide a substantive analysis of the SW model. Indeed, there
are many thorough critiques of this model, including very incisive critique by the au-
thors themselves, especially in joint work with Del Negro and Schorfheide (Del Negro
et al. (2007)). We argue that the sort of posterior predictive analysis illustrated above
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provides a complementary tool and is especially useful for highlighting strengths and
weaknesses of the models as they pertain to particular uses such as policymaking.
3.4 Elaborations and Abuses
We have deliberately stuck to fairly straightforward illustrations in the previous section
in order to introduce these tools. There are many natural elaborations. For example,
as Gelman notes, one might want to condition all the computations on certain data
features. We have deliberately focused on basic applications of the ideas behind prior
and posterior predictive analysis in order to introduce the ideas.
We have examined many different data features. Of course, whenever one has mul-
tiple statistics there are multiple ways they might be combined and consolidated. For
example, one could take account of the full joint distribution of some group of features.
Thus, one could ask how likely the model would be to produce sample jointly showing
values as extreme as the realized values. One could also combine the features into some
portmanteau feature and only consider the marginal distribution of the overall combined
feature. We have argued for the benefits of interpretability of the features and such a
portmanteau would probably lose some of that.
Any discussion of the myriad features one might combine naturally leads to a dis-
cussion of how this approach might be misused and abused. On any sample, we can
define features that are as ‘freakish’ as we like in the sense of being present in a small
proportion of all samples. Indiscriminate assessment of long lists of features will, with
probability one, lead one to discover that each random sample (like each child) is special
in its own way. As Gelman et al. (1996), Hill (1996) and many others emphasize, any
tool like this must be used with judgement.
In particular, we are suggesting using these tools to highlight areas of consonance
and of dissonance between the model any strongly held views about the only existing
sample. As we raise this topic, however, we begin to squarely face the third major point
of the chapter: the standard criticisms of prior and posterior predictive analysis and
what we argue is a nonstandard defense in the DSGE context.
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4 Standard Criticisms and a Nonstandard Defense
of Posterior Predictive Analysis
While we believe that posterior predictive analysis could be an extremely useful tool,
uses so far in the DSGE literature have been limited. This may, in part, be because of
the strong arguments often stated against the coherence of this form of inference.
In this section, we argue that standard arguments against posterior predictive
analysis—whatever their merits in other cases—are moot or miss the point in the DSGE
context. Indeed, posterior predictive analysis is arguably a natural pragmatic attempt
to apply Bayesian principles under challenging conditions.
4.1 Standard Criticisms
Prior and posterior predictive analysis like all inference based on hypothetical other
samples, violate the likelihood principle, which “essentially states that all evidence,
which is obtained from an experiment, about an unknown quantity θ, is contained in
the likelihood function of θ for the given data. . . ” (Berger and Wolpert, 1984, p.1).
Given that prior and posterior predictive analysis share with frequentist analysis an
emphasis on behavior in repeated sampling, many of the objections echo the arguments
in the familiar frequentist vs. Bayesian debate.
One cannot deny that troubling problems can arise whenever one attempts to cast
doubt on a model when based on the fact that was observed in the sample was less likely
than other samples that were not in fact observed.21 One way of seeing the problem of
casting doubt on a model due to the fact that the sample at hand is unlikely is that
this approach begs the question ‘unlikely compared to what?’ We have no alternative
model that renders the existing sample more likely. Inference without an explicit alter-
native is fraught a host of problems, leading some to the summary judgement (Bayarri
and Berger, 1999, p.72), “The notion of testing whether or not data are compatible
21The literature here is immense. For a recent treatment aimed at economists, see Geweke (2010).
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with a given model without specifying any alternative is indeed very attractive, but,
unfortunately, it seems to be beyond reach.”
Geweke (2010), (p.25), argues that, while both prior and posterior predictive analy-
sis violate the likelihood principle, but posterior predictive analysis involves “a violation
of the likelihood principle that many Bayesians regard as egregious.” This is in part
because in this analysis uses the data twice in an important sense (without taking for-
mal account of this fact). One checks the freakishness of the sample using the posterior
that was already updated using that same sample.
Berger and Wolpert (1984) offer the following judgement about the use of such
techniques:
Of course, even this use of significance testing [as proposed by Box] as an
alert could be questioned, because of the matter of averaging over unob-
served x. It is hard to see what else could be done with [the maintained
model] alone, however, and it is sometimes argued that time constraints
preclude consideration of alternatives. This may occasionally be true, but
is probably fairly rare. Even cursory consideration of alternatives and a
few rough likelihood ratio calculations will tend to give substantially more
insight than will a significance level, and will usually not be much more
difficult than sensibly choosing T [the data feature] and calculating the sig-
nificance level. (p.109)
We begin our defense of posterior predictive analysis by accepting (or, at least,
choosing not to contest) essentially all of Berger and Wolpert’s points. In particular,
until recently, Berger and Wolpert’s claim that specifying explicit alternatives, perhaps
in a cursory manner, is easy was nearly a tautology. Until recently, Bayesian methods
were computationally infeasible except in trivial cases and constructing cursory alter-
natives in such cases may be easy. Constructing meaningful alternative models of the
world macroeconomy with fully articulated causal channels, we argue, is not easy. And,
thus, we claim this is one of the rare cases.
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We also agree with Berger and Wolpert that when one comes across a rare cases
where specifying alternatives is not trivial, it is difficult to imagine any systematic way
to proceed other than some variant of the basic idea laid out by Box, and that is what
we are proposing. But our defense of posterior predictive analysis goes considerably
deeper based on a number of features that distinguish the DSGE context from that
contemplated in the plain vanilla scheme.
4.2 Nonstandard Defense of Posterior Predictive Analysis for
a Nonstandard Context
One slowly growing sample. In DSGE modeling, macroeconomists are attempting to
formalize and reify our understanding of the world economy. Unfortunately, while
the available sample regarding the general equilibrium process is growing, it grows
sufficiently slowly that we may treat it as fixed.22 The many rounds of refinement take
place using the same data and the formal prior and posterior in all DSGE work are best
viewed as two different ways of using the same sample. The ‘posterior’ for the current
model will soon be replaced by another ‘posterior’ for a revised model, and this new
‘posterior’ will be computed on the same data as were the many previous versions.
For the remainder of this section by posterior in italics we simply mean what this
term has come to mean in the DSGE literature: the result of the latest round of update
on the familiar sample.
Given the intertwining of expertise and the only sample it is almost inevitable that
certain strongly held prior views regard the current sample. For example, at the most
general level, most macroeconomists believe that systematically repeated features of the
business cycle are in fact systematic features of the underlying mechanism. Posterior
predictive analysis then can be seen as a pragmatic way to check the consistency of the
model+posterior with difficult to impose prior views.
22by general consensus (confirmed over the 30 year development process) the new information in a
few observations is unlikely to provide much additional information. Observations like those from the
recent crisis are arguably highly informative, but generally raise more questions than answers.
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The current model by general consensus remains materially deficient. The model
+posterior , whatever its merits, will be used to inform current decision making and
as a basis for the next round of model refinement. Much of the analysis we advocate
might, in principle be carried out using prior predictive analysis and Geweke (2010),
(p.24), makes a strong case for doing so based on the position that we should place
“specification analysis ahead of formal inference.” Prior predictive analysis can be used
in this specification analysis step, but any posterior analysis on what will be treated as
the posterior update sample must be confined to the formal inference step.
This analysis does not conform well to the case where we have ongoing refinement
of a materially deficient model that is going on in parallel with actual decision making
based on the current best model. Substantive ongoing specification analysis has in
the past and will for the foreseeable future accompany use of the current posterior .
Perhaps the simplest way to avoid this debate is to consider the current posterior to be
the prior for use in the next stage of ongoing specification analysis.
As an overarching idea, however, we think it is uncontestable that if the current
model+posterior are thought to be materially flawed and yet will be used in policy
analysis, searching for problematic predictions from this model+posterior must be con-
sistent with good sense as well as Bayesian principles.
There is an alternative to the model—the current subjective policymaking machinery.
In the context of DSGE modelling for policy analysis, it is important to emphasize there
is an alternative: the implicit model in the current subjective policymaking process.
A natural inclination might be to argue that we should render that model formal and
explicit, and that this newly formalized model is the model to which we should compare
the DSGE model. Of course, this misses the point entirely.
The current DSGE models built for policymaking are the current state of our efforts
to reify the current policymaking process—to formalize the good and throw out the
bad. Our defense of posterior predictive analysis is that it can render the process of
enriching and refining the model more efficient by focusing attention on areas that are
most troubling from the standpoint of the task at hand.
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4.3 An Alternative: Patch up the Plain Vanilla Scheme
In our experience discussing these issues, there is a very strong and proper urge to
consider the possibility that we could—perhaps in some cursory way as suggested by
Berger and Wolpert—paper over the difficult aspects of the DSGE context and somehow
follow some scheme that has a reasonable pragmatic interpretation as being consistent
with the plain vanilla scheme.
Obviously, these suggestions involve methods to eliminate ad hoc aspects of the prior
and to accommodate in some way the most gross deficiencies of the model. For example,
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) what appears to be a very useful approach to training
samples as a method to reducing the sort of problems with the conventional DSGE prior
that they emphasize and that we have illustrated above. Geweke has recently provided
a brilliant monograph on working with complete and incomplete econometric models,
which involves methods for comparing explicit models based on particular features and
setting aside certain types of deficiency.
All these strike us as very good ideas that should find widespread uses. We argue
that that are complementary to our suggestions, however. Such steps cannot overturn
the fact that for the foreseeable future, our best complete general equilibrium model
will be materially deficient, in an ongoing state of refinement on a single dataset, and
simultaneously in use in policymaking. We argue that under these conditions, any
coherent class of analysis must allow for the examination of the flaws of the current
model+posterior that is informing the policymaking process.
5 Conclusions
The modelling of causal channels in a large, dynamic system, with forward looking
behavior is an incredibly daunting task. It is made even more challenging by the fact
that we have a single dataset on which to both develop and test our theories. That
dataset is small in relevant senses.
Perhaps it is not surprising in such a challenging context that there is little consensus
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in the profession on key substantive economic topics or on modelling methodology.
The unprecedented Congressional hearing on DSGE modelling underscores both the
unfortunate state of affairs and the fact that improving on this state of affairs is in the
interest of everyone subject to the policy decisions informed by these models.
We argue for taking as a starting point that these models will actively be used in
policy analysis while remaining in an ongoing state of material refinement. Seen in this
light, posterior predictive analysis, we argue, can be a very useful tool for highlighting
strengths and weaknesses pertinent to policy. We particularly argue for the focus on
what we call structural features as a way to assess causal channels in the model. This
type of analytics has received little prior use in DSGE modelling. The overarching
idea is that the the type of analysis we advocate may serve to inform policymakers of
limitations of the current models (which can then be judgementally allowed for) and to
direct resources of the model refinement efforts to areas most relevant to policymaking.
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Figure 1: Prior and posterior densities for habit persistence and CRRA parameters.
Blue dashed line is the prior; black line is the posterior. The parameters are
described more fully in the text.
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a) Histogram for 50 observation, realized sample
sample skewness=1.05
−2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
pval=0.002
b) Prior predictive density and realized value for sample skewness
Figure 2: Example of prior predictive analysis. Panel a) Histogram of 50 sample
observations. Panel b) The prior predictive density for sample skewness and re-
alized value for sample. The prior is that the sample points are iid N(µ, 1) and
the prior for µ is uniform on [0, 1]. The sample skewness of 1.05 is shown in red
on the right hand panel. The stated p-value is the share of the mass of the prior
predictive density exceeding the realized sample skewness.
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Figure 3: Posterior density for population correlation of output and inflation (blue
dashed) and posterior predictive density for the sample correlation (black solid).
Red line is the realized value on the sample. The numbers in the upper left give
the proportion of mass under the posterior and posterior predictive density, respec-
tively, that is to the left of the realized value.
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(a) Prior and Posterior for Population Correlation






(b) Prior Predictive and Posterior Predictive for 
Sample Correlation
Figure 4: Correlation of consumption and investment growth. Panel a) Prior (blue
dashed) and posterior (black solid) for population correlation. Panel b) Prior pre-
dictive (blue dashed) and posterior predictive (black solid) for sample correlation.
The numbers in the upper left give the share of points in the smaller tail relative to
the red line for the two densities on the panel, with value for prior before posterior.
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Figure 5: Prior predictive (dashed blue) and posterior predictive (solid black) den-
sities for one-step forecast error correlations. Each panel is for a sample correlation
of the output growth error ∆Y and the error for one of the other variables in
the model: ∆C, consumption growth; ∆I, investment growth; hours, ∆w, wage
growth; pi, inflation; r, interest rate. The errors come from a VAR(1) estimated on
the sample. Red line is for the VAR(1) value on the realized sample. The numbers
in the upper left give the share of points in the smaller tail relative to the red line
for the two densities on the panel, with value for prior before posterior.
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Figure 6: Historical decomposition of output growth in terms of the structural
shocks. The 7 shocks have been averaged over calendar years and summed across
broad categories. The ‘demand shocks’ include the risk premium, investment-
specific technology, and exogenous spending shocks; the ‘mark-up shocks’ include


















































Figure 7: Structural feature scatter plots for the smoothed risk-premium (rp)
shock. Panel a) is for the standard deviation of the rp shock; the remaining pan-
els are for the sample correlation of the rp shock with other structural shocks in
the model: productivity, investment productivity, government spending, mone-
tary policy, price mark-up, and wage mark-up. Horizontal axis plots the posterior
density for the realized sample; vertical axis plots the posterior predictive values.
The number in the upper left gives the smaller share of points on either side of























Figure 8: Structural feature scatter plot for the sample standard deviation of the
smoothed risk-premium shock in recessions and expansions. Panel (a) is for the full
sample, (b) recessions, (c) expansions. In panel (d), the feature is the difference
in the standard deviation for recessions and expansions. Horizontal axis plots the
posterior values for the realized sample; vertical axis plots the posterior predictive
values. The number in the upper left gives the smaller share of points on either
side of the 45 degree line.
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